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ABSTRACT
John F. Kennedy's presidential rhetoric reflects key criteria necessary for creating and
sustaining the American Camelot myth. That myth was successfully ingrained into the
American psyche through the use of visual rhetoric, campaign speech rhetoric, and crisis
time rhetoric. Moreover, the collective memory of cultural trauma following Kennedy's
assassination suggests a promising continuation of the Camelot myth. Because the four
rhetorical categories (visual, campaign, crisis, and collective memory) worked in tandem,
all were essential for creating Kennedy's legacy, and together solidified Kennedy’s
lasting reputation as a skilled rhetor.
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CHAPTER 1
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION

John F. Kennedy, thirty-fifth President of the United States, presided over what is now
known as America’s “Camelot” (Brigance 2). However, underneath his seemingly
utopian leadership lie many personal and political secrets. Despite the carefully crafted
professional persona he wore in front of the American public, he was privately dishonest,
unethical, and fatally flawed. He “reveled in personal excess and recklessness,” and often
lied about matters if the truth threatened his reputation (Hersh 2). A telling attestation of
his propensity to be less than honest involves his own fragile health—a lifelong battle he
learned to hide in early childhood (13). Facts regarding his numerous health conditions,
many of which were not available until years after his death, report Kennedy suffered
from Addison’s disease, irritable bowel syndrome, hypertension, failing vision, the onset
of gum disease, partial deafness, failing back syndrome, and a sexually transmitted
disease, among other conditions; Kennedy often blatantly denied any such illnesses
(Giglio 349; Hersh 5). As a result of his complex medical problems, Kennedy took a
regimen of medicines, some of them, such as amphetamines, highly addictive and on
which he developed an unhealthy dependency—another fact he kept hidden from the
American public (Giglio 349). He also lied concerning his extramarital affairs. His string
of mistresses is now public knowledge, as is a secret first marriage for which he and his
men stole all related official documents, thus ensuring his wife could not damage his
political career (as she could have easily done with official documents since she and
Kennedy never officially divorced) (Hersh 2-3, 10-11). Despite a successful, albeit
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temporary, cover up of his first marriage, a later romantic fling did, in fact, affect his
presidency: the leg brace he wore in addition to his usual back brace the day of his
assassination was the result of a groin injury he suffered during a tryst with one of his
many lovers. The brace prevented him from ducking after the initial bullet struck his
throat, leaving him upright and vulnerable to the second bullet that shot through his head,
killing him (Giglio 353; Hersh 12). Naturally, this fact was not documented in his official
autopsy report, and was only told to the public decades later (Hersh 12).
Beyond his questionable health and marital matters, Kennedy also lied about
political corruption, such as his support for assassination plots made by members of the
Republican Party concerning select world leaders—plots he supported while still serving
in the United States Senate (Hersh 3-4). He continued committing unethical political acts
while on the campaign trail in 1960; his bribery of the Chicago-based mafia and the local
and state officials of West Virginia are now knowledge open to the public (4-5, 90). As
President, he placated J. Edgar Hoover by re-appointing him Director of the FBI out of
fear that Hoover would publicize information which would irreparably damage his career
(6). Later in his Presidency, Kennedy struck a private deal with Nikita Khrushchev
concerning American missiles in Turkey so as to avoid World War III—a fact he kept
hidden from both the American public and ExComm, the ad hoc committee designed to
handle that situation (3). As he prepared for the 1964 re-election campaign, Kennedy was
yet again linked to financial corruption and bribery so as to ensure another election
victory (5). These examples of Kennedy’s deception regarding his personal and political
life reflect only a sample of his questionable doings. Compounding these acts of unethical
behavior is the fact that throughout his career in Congress and the Oval Office, he
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accomplished relatively little; as Herbert Parmet points out, Kennedy’s administration
brought about “no social and economic transformation…closed out the New and Fair
Deal reform movement,” owed much of its progressive reputation to the conveniently and
“timely marriage of technology and nature” and lacked anyone who resembled what
America now considers a “Jack Kennedy” type politician (33). In other words, Jack
Kennedy did not even resemble the Jack Kennedy society assumes existed, and failed to
accomplish much worth praising. However, his popularity has not flagged since his
death. Writer John Murphy notes in his analysis of the beloved leader: “Since John
Kennedy’s death, scholars and revisionists, scriptwriters and novelists have failed to
shake the public’s admiration for his presidency. Indeed, the most recent poll conducted
of historians ranks John Kennedy eighth in the presidential pecking order” (Murphy 579).
A looming question lying in the wake of such a positive report despite scandalous
revelations is thus: Why is Kennedy’s tenure still regarded as “Camelot,” and why have
recent insights into the personal and political flaws of the late President done little, if
anything, to sway the public’s positive regard for him?
Camelot literally means “a time, place, or atmosphere of idyllic happiness”
(Merriam-Webster 177). Although the literary tradition of Camelot involves King Arthur,
Queen Guinevere, and the infamous Knights of the Round Table, the American Camelot
encompasses a different type of mythic leadership—a modern, democratic tale that is
both romanticized and uniquely Americanized. This version of Camelot centers on a
prominent family who, for a short time, exercised seemingly respectable leadership over
a nation facing both domestic and foreign threats. In regard to Kennedy’s presidency, the
term “Camelot” specifically reflects the characteristic ephemeral nature of his dynasty as
3

according to his widow, Jacqueline. She told family friend and reporter Theodore White
in an interview just three weeks after Kennedy’s death that the late president was
particularly fond of a song from Alan J. Lerner’s and Frederick Loewe’s Broadway play
Camelot (Brigance 3). Jackie repeated the lyrics for White, who reported them to the
public, hence solidifying the mythic reputation that has become a lasting part of
American cultural history: “Don’t let it be forgot, that once there was a spot, for one brief
shining moment that was known as Camelot” (qtd. in Brigance 2). Jackie then went on to
confidently state that “there’ll be great Presidents again…but there’ll never be another
Camelot…This was Camelot…Let’s never forget” (2). Although he was only in office for
slightly more than one thousand days, and despite the fact that he had done little
politically to prove himself among the great American Presidents, Jackie’s claim to
Camelot has characterized Kennedy’s presidency ever since the White interview (Moy
249). As Linda Czuba Brigance notes, “Americans searched for ways to make sense of
the [assassination]…After the publication of White’s interview with Mrs. Kennedy, the
popular media and the general public seized upon Camelot to represent the Kennedy era”
as a means to understand and cope with the President’s death (2). Furthermore, the
Kennedy family itself is still regarded as “American Royalty” (Brigance 5). In fact, the
idea of Camelot has persisted to the point that during the 2008 presidential campaign,
John Kennedy’s daughter, Caroline Kennedy, and his brother, Senator Edward Kennedy,
stated in a national interview with Diane Sawyer that they felt Barack Obama would
inherit, and thus revive, Camelot by imitating John’s youthful and optimistic appeal
(Sawyer, Gibson, and Stephanopoulis). In other words, current presidential candidates are
still being compared to Kennedy, meaning his time in office—his rule of Camelot—has
4

left a lasting impact on Washington while also creating a set of standards by which the
American public will judge any presidential candidate who resembles him. Whether or
not Obama rhetorically resembles Kennedy, although interesting and undoubtedly worth
in-depth investigation of its own, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the exact
rhetorical criteria that made Camelot, Camelot is now under investigation. What
rhetorical qualities did Kennedy exercise that led the public to so readily embrace
Jackie’s claim that her husband was not only a great leader, but also an Arthur-type
figure?
Over the course of the following pages, I will argue that there are three categories
of rhetoric characteristic of Kennedy’s career that ensured his permanent place within
American history as the modern Arthur: visual rhetoric, campaign speech rhetoric, and
crisis time rhetoric. Additionally, a fourth rhetorical category has organically attached
itself to his presidency in the years following his assassination: rhetoric of collective
memory and cultural trauma. The sum total of these four categories composes Camelot’s
rhetoric. Camelot can never be replicated or resuscitated, as to do so would require that
these four rhetorical categories not only be present in a president’s administration, but
that they also be present in the same degree and under the same circumstances that
initiated and characterized them in the first place, and that they be executed in the same
manner as they were by Kennedy. Because the passage of time continuously shapes
politics as well as culture, and because the present political and cultural climate is vastly
different from that of the 1960s, Kennedy’s Camelot can never again exist—it is
impossible to replicate the rhetoric that shaped and defined it.

5

A Brief Historical Overview of Kennedy’s Career
John F. Kennedy’s association with politics dated earlier than his campaigns for
representative, senator, or president; as the grandson of former Boston mayor John F.
“Honey Fitz” Fitzgerald, and son of former United States Ambassador to the United
Kingdom Joseph P. Kennedy, John grew up in a prominent family, surrounded by
politicians (Hersh 35, 44-47, 63). The Kennedys were a large, wealthy family very
familiar with the social scenes of both America and Europe (Hersh 63). After returning
from World War II as a decorated war hero, Kennedy sought political office (Hersh 14).
When he did so, he already had support from his grandfather’s and father’s political
alliances; all he needed to do, then, was add to the backing granted him by his
forebearers’ careers with voters he won over on his own—a task he embraced and at
which he excelled.
Kennedy began his political career by serving in the United States House of
Representatives from 1947 until 1953. He then served in the United States Senate until
1960, when he began his presidential campaign. In neither position did he prove anything
to suggest great leadership qualities; his job performance was merely average (Sorensen
43). However, after extensive campaigning, he won the presidential election and was
inaugurated as the youngest American President on January 20th, 1961 (Sorensen 179;
“John Fitzgerald Kennedy”). Almost immediately, Kennedy faced a number of crises that
threatened the country with nuclear holocaust, mounting tensions between the U.S. and
Communist nations, financial upheavals in the economic and business sectors, and
unchecked racism in the southern region. In fact, the Bay of Pigs incident took place in
April of 1961—only three months after his inauguration (Chase and Lerman 65). Other
6

situations such as the Berlin Crisis, Steel Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, and segregation
riots in Alabama and Mississippi are among the most infamous of the other crises
Kennedy faced while president, yet still do not portray an exhaustive list of the
challenging circumstances he confronted (see Kern, Levering and Levering 37, as well as
Sorensen 393, 635, 661 for additional crises). In fact, the Bay of Pigs incident took place
in April of 1961—only three months after his inauguration (Chase and Lerman 65). As
history books have recorded, the situation did not end well for the new president, and
nearly squelched his approval ratings. However, throughout all the crises, including that
of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy relied on a specific style of rhetoric to not only explain the
matters at hand to the general public, but to also maintain, and even accrue more, support
from American citizens.
Conflict characterized Kennedy’s administration until he was assassinated in the
midst of escalating national and international stress (Depoe 220). Trying situations such
as those that gave birth to the Vietnam War, only waxed in the years following his death
(Schlesinger 996-97, 1009). As Bruce Miroff notes, “Kennedy’s death came to organize
popular understanding of modern American history…After his assassination, the nation
found itself spiraling downward, into race riots, overseas catastrophes, and economic
stagnation” (qtd. in Brigance 7-8). Although Kennedy would have had to face the “race
riots, overseas catastrophes, and economic stagnation” had he lived, and even though his
presidential efficacy would have in turn reflected such circumstances, his administration
ended on a relatively positive note, and is therefore still regarded as Camelot, a “golden
age” in Washington that crumbled upon the President’s November 1963 assassination
(Brigance 7; Murphy 577-78). Rather than assume he would have made mistakes if and
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when he encountered the pressures his successors did, Americans typically assume he
would have solved any conflict before the brink of destruction, much as he did during the
Cuban Missile Crisis.
In addition to the downward spiral of specific events jumpstarted by Kennedy’s
assassination, such as the increasingly unwinnable Vietnam War, larger and more general
circumstances ensued that also brought with them cause for alarm, such as the social
uproar against the traditional values of the 1950s, and, maybe more importantly, a cynical
distrust of the government (Brigance 7-8). After he was struck down and could no longer
protect the nation, the political arena suffered, and the nation replaced the safety formerly
felt under his leadership with uncertainty and fear. His posthumous apotheosis speaks to
the positive effect he had on has country that was immediately missed by the public upon
his death. Research produced since his assassination proves his positive impact was
largely due to rhetorical qualities. However, scholars often disagree as to what rhetorical
components were most significant in the Kennedy White House. While an exhaustive
meta analysis of all rhetorical devices Kennedy used would prove overwhelming for a
thesis of this scope, key strategies consistently appeared between 1960 and 1963 that
merit closer examination. Thus, those strategies upon which Kennedy often relied will be
investigated by aligning them with the respective proper rhetorical theory so as to prove
his persuasive appeal was not accidental, but instead followed patterns that were meant to
influence the public the way they did.
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Relevant Theories for Evaluating Camelot
For each of the rhetorical categories that helped create Camelot, specific theories
apply that explain how Kennedy’s use of rhetorical strategies appealed to the public. He
understood how to use visual media to the best of his advantage and thus gain voter
interest. He was well aware at the start of his career that his physical appearance would
be a great asset to him, and knew securing voters required him to visually portray himself
as a competent, qualified, desirable politician. To do so, Kennedy continued replicating
the visual rhetoric he had grown up demonstrating: portraying an individual and family
image consisting of, well-dressed, athletic, intellectual, and seemingly happy, wholesome
members with whom the American public could identify. In other words, he kept up an
“‘ordinary’ demeanor—a quality that in itself is extraordinary among politicians”
(Sorensen 19). This concept served him exceptionally well during the 1960 presidential
campaign, as his athletically fit, bronzed body suggested youthful health. Images of he
and his young wife Jackie, who was expecting their second child toward the end of the
campaign, and their young daughter Caroline visually represented what was widely
regarded as the average nuclear family unit (Hersh 88). When Jackie and Caroline were
unable to travel the campaign circuit because of the former’s pregnancy, Kennedy’s
sisters and mother stepped in to add the feminine appeal and balance his wife and
daughter were unable to (Sorensen 173). The televised campaign debates with Nixon
further proved an invaluable means by which to attract voters. In fact, studies report that
among citizens who listened to the first debate on the radio, Nixon was thought to have
won; among those who watched it on television, Kennedy was considered the winner
(Druckman 563; Hersh 155). Although three subsequent televised debates followed, the
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tone the initial one set indicated good reason for Kennedy to so optimistically rely on
visual media during his campaign and presidency.
Relevant theories that will be explored in the coming chapter to explain how such
visual rhetoric impacted the public in these situations include the following as informed
by Deanna Sellnow: media logic, a theory first offered by David Altheide and Robert
Snow that explains how and why visual media caught the attention of so many
Americans; David Horton and R. Richard Wohl’s parasocial relationship theory, which
deals with the feelings of intimacy in one-sided relationships; visual pleasure theory,
originally conceptualized by Laura Mulvey, which demonstrates how physical
appearance satisfies the male gaze; psychoanalytic theory as originally informed by
Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, which uses scopopheia and narcissism to explain why
audiences find certain images to be pleasurable; and Albert Bandura’s social learning
theory, which emphasizes how individuals act as role models for others.
The second rhetorical category necessary to Camelot’s existence was campaign
rhetoric. Although a member of a well-known and attractive family, Kennedy was not
associated with such a strong tradition in terms of campaign speech-making. In fact,
scholars have noted that during the early stages of his 1960 campaign, he lacked the
oratorical skills that later came to characterize his speeches (Powell 59). Despite serving
as both a representative and senator before running for executive office, and almost being
chosen as Adlai Stevenson’s running mate in the presidential campaign of 1956, Kennedy
was, as of 1959, a rather awkward public speaker, according to friend and The Making of
the President: 1960 author Theodore H. White (Schlesinger 9; qtd. in Powell 59). Within
the year that the young senator spent travelling the country recruiting voters he hoped
10

would place him in the White House, he grew from the awkward, untrained orator of
1959 into the polished, suave speaker of 1960 who left his legendary—and permanent—
mark on American politics. Scholars and politicians alike have attested to Kennedy’s
memorable rhetoric, as John W. Gardner, editor of To Turn the Tide notes: “President
Kennedy [had] an extraordinary capacity to express himself in speech and in writing.
Rarely has an American President stated the nation’s problems with such clarity, or
voiced its aspirations so movingly” (vii). Some scholars argue that factors such as these,
and not the actual content of his speeches, composed the bulk of Kennedy’s rhetorical
appeal. For example, James Powell identifies in his article “Reactions to John F.
Kennedy’s Delivery Skills During the 1960 Campaign” the personable and affable tactics
Kennedy used to attract voters and build his legacy, such as his natural demeanor,
energetic delivery, frequent eye contact, and candid sense of humor that often analyzed
emotional moments in an objective tone so as to inject levity into otherwise predictable,
and occasionally boring, political engagements. None of the memorable qualities of
Kennedy’s speechmaking Powell listed dealt with the statistical, logical, or analytical
aspects of the speech’s content (59, 62, 64, 66). Close friend and advisor Theodore
Sorensen also took note of Kennedy’s candid humor in his book, Kennedy: “I came to
marvel at his…candid and objective responses to public questions” (13). A brief example
of this last rhetorical strategy is aptly illustrated by Kennedy’s response to being asked by
a reporter where he found so much bravery so as to not only voluntarily enlist in the
service during World War II, but to also save his comrades after their U-boat was sunk by
Axis powers. Kennedy responded with the following: “It was involuntary. They sunk my
boat” (Moy 247). On another occasion, after being swarmed by warm-wishers during a
11

campaign appearance, he joked that he would “never know…why anyone would leave
his home just to watch a politician go by,” demonstrating his ability to separate from his
own interest in the campaign and view it objectively (Sorensen 180). Even when
speaking to those who did not support him in the campaign, he retained his characteristic
sense of humor; when a drunken woman threw a glass of whiskey in his face in
Milwaukee, he simply “wiped off the whiskey, handed back the tumbler and said in even
tones, ‘Here’s your glass’” (181). Neither friend nor foe could faze his sense of humor,
and because of his reactions to both protagonistic and antagonistic situations, he easily
drew laughs and voters alike. Of course, humor was not his only rhetorical strategy
during the campaign.
Relevant theories that will be used in the following chapters to interpret how his
campaign rhetoric beneficially functioned include the following: concepts from
Aristotle’s second cannon; Max Weber’s theory of charismatic leaders; John Murphy’s
theory of heroic tradition in presidential rhetoric; Edward Corbett’s theory of elocution;
and George Campbell’s theory on wit and humor.
Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric proved successful in aiding him to election victory,
and he was sworn into office in January 1961. At the time of Kennedy’s election, the
American public still widely regarded the federal government as fair and truly
democratic: “Kennedy…had the advantage of his generation, of sharing involvement in
foreign policy issues with the press during a self-confident epoch before the shattering
results of the nation’s Vietnam policies inaugurated a process that altered public attitudes
toward presidential authority” (Kern, Levering, and Levering 6). Although America
would face much tougher times following the President’s death, Kennedy entered office
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with the mindset that most situations were “problems” or “crises,” and thus aimed to
influence American citizens to share that view, regardless of the relatively peaceful time
in which he became president. Some scholars even argue that because Kennedy suffered
a traumatic experience in World War II, he was conditioned to interpret all political
situations encountered during his career as potential crises that could, and would, quickly
grow uncontrollable (Meagher 50). Just as he had predicted, Kennedy found himself, and
his country, dealing with tense situations that required of him a certain type of rhetoric
when informing the American public; though he selected from a vast resource bank of
rhetorical strategy during crises, five particular techniques repeatedly appeared during his
tenure. In addition, one technique which appeared only once was so unique to his
administration and American politics at that time that it deserves special attention.
The six previously mentioned characteristic techniques and rhetorical theories,
although not always explained through a specific established theory, demonstrate
Kennedy’s crisis handling methods. These techniques, which will be covered in the
upcoming chapters, include the following: arousing fear in the public concerning
inevitable crises, using antithesis to encourage nonpartisan cooperation and civic service
to overcome crises, appealing to time, making no promises about crises’ outcomes,
manipulating the press to portray the most favorable interpretation of the outcomes, and,
when left no other choice, admitting strategic mistakes and taking responsibility for
undesirable outcomes.
Pulling the nation through times of peril, or as Kennedy termed it, the “hour of
maximum danger,” qualified him in the eyes of many Americans as a decent, possibly
even above-average, leader (Kennedy 4; Sheatsley and Feldman 205). Although approval
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ratings published approximately two weeks before his assassination showed no signs of
undue esteem nor of unwarranted disdain, his legacy was entombed within the league of
the heroic following his 1963 assassination (Sheatsley and Feldman 205; Brigance 5).
The nation witnessed the violent and traumatic death suffered by the youngest president
to have ever resided in the Oval Office when he was shot to death during a televised and
heavily attended parade in Dallas. Swayed by their emotions following the tragedy, many
citizens reported thoughts and opinions toward Kennedy that were much kinder than
those they would have normally expressed (Sheatsley and Feldman 205). The enduring
reputation Kennedy left behind is one of extraordinary persuasive appeal entombed
within an untouchable mythic framework constructed by his widow, passed down
through the generations, and still highly regarded as of the current day.
Examining Kennedy’s assassination through the lens of collective memory and
cultural trauma explains how he transitioned from the realm of mortals to that of legends.
Relevant theorists and concepts that will be consulted in the following chapters include
the following: Judith Herman’s trauma theory concerning the nature and consequences of
trauma; Susannah Radstone’s examination of trauma’s context; Marco Bacciagaluppi’s
and Eliżbieta Halas’ studies of psychic trauma’s outcomes on collective memory; Emile
Durkheim’s theory on collective response to cultural experiences; and Victor
Roudometof’s research in cultural trauma’s transmission through the generations.
Throughout all rhetorical situations, Kennedy strove for an immortal and
permanent legacy. Kennedy’s life and time in office embodies the “modern American
hero tale, [as] the life and career of John F. Kennedy, is perhaps even the major American
mythology of our time. It has spread out across a proliferating chain of contemporary
14

texts, meditations of a culture attempting passage through its present doubt and
confusion” (Hellman ix-x). However, there are those who hold that Kennedy’s rhetoric
was rooted in impure motives, therefore he does not deserve to be regarded as a hero: “I
believe Kennedy’s rhetoric, while idealistic, is not innocent,” as Camelot did lead to
Vietnam, among other negative situations (Blackmore 167). Although certain
ramifications did occur as a result of Kennedy’s legislative policies and the public is now
aware of the many scandals with which the late president is associated, it is still
undeniable that “John Kennedy performed the presidency as a heroic office. Yet it was a
peculiarly modern heroism” (Murphy 591). As a rhetorically effective politician who
incorporated specific persuasive strategies into his visual appearance, presidential
campaign, and handling of crises, the permanent scar left on the American collective
memory following his assassination is no surprise, nor is his heroic legacy. He was an
American Arthur, and he alone will be the only President ever associated with the
American Camelot. Because of the unique rhetorical factors that led to its creation and
solidification in this nation’s history, Kennedy’s Camelot can never again exist.
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CHAPTER 2
VISUAL RHETORIC

This chapter examines the visual rhetoric theories relevant to how John Kennedy
garnered support from the American public, including media logic theory, parasocial
relationship theory, visual pleasure and psychoanalytic theory, and social learning theory.

Visual rhetoric played an initial and ongoing role in shaping Camelot, as images
of the Kennedy family circulated in both America and Europe before John even initiated
his political career (Collier and Horowitz 90). To understand through a scholarly lens
how and why the public found the Kennedys, specifically John, appealing, five particular
concepts and theories prove useful: media logic theory, parasocial relationship theory,
visual pleasure theory, psychoanalytic theory, and social learning theory. Examples
demonstrating these concepts and theories include the novelty of the televised KennedyNixon debates, the intimacy of Jackie’s White House tour, the pleasing appearance of
John and Jackie in photographs, and Jackie’s influence on fashion. These rhetorical
situations served as the foundation on which Camelot was built; without the visual nature
of Kennedy’s life, campaign, and presidency, it is doubtful the Camelot myth would have
taken hold.

Media Logic
Media logic theory, first coined by David Altheide and Robert Snow, “focuses on
the degree to which viewers tend to take the medium and its social uses for granted and,
16

thus, to fail to realize how it influences us to believe and behave about what is normal,
good, desirable, and so forth” (Sellnow 162, emphasis hers). Although televised
presidential debates are common practice in contemporary society, television as a source
of disseminating political campaign material in 1960 was a novelty to the American
public. Because the televised 1960 debates were unique in this manner, more Americans
engaged in the campaign than would have otherwise (Becker and Lower 49; Windt, Jr.,
“The Public Presidency 94). Thus, using television as a means to garner support was a
strategic rhetorical decision, and one that Kennedy heavily favored until his death: “The
presidential administration of John F. Kennedy is widely seen as having significantly
expanded the interaction between White House politics and broadcast television”
(Marcus 77). Although his preference for media centered political activity (such as his
weekly press conferences [Salinger ix]), became common in the years following his
election, the debates between him and Nixon emphasized the innovation of a televised
presidential debate. As one scholar notes, “Under our governmental conventions, no
president engage[d] in face-to-face debate with the titular head of the opposing political
party. President Kennedy, for instance, [did] not ordinarily debate with Mr. Nixon or Mr.
Eisenhower as head of the Republican Party. At most he engages in long-range sniping
through press conferences” (Laswell 21). There were no face-to-face debates like the
Great Debate between Kennedy and Nixon prior to the 1960 campaign because of two
particular reasons: 1. Candidates were “not willing to risk the hazards of debate” and 2.
There was “no medium which…[made] such encounters so logical and compelling”
(Sarnoff 57). However, when Senator Kennedy insisted he and Vice President Nixon
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participate in at least four televised debates, the nature of presidential elections changed
permanently (Laswell 19).
The visual rhetoric of the televised appearances played such a critical role in
shaping the reputation of Kennedy, his family, and administration that at least one scholar
has suggested that
Few viewers paid attention to what he said, but people who would never
read a complete transcript of a press conference were able to watch their
President handle the press. In those innocent times, it was the drama of
Kennedy facing reporters. His mastery of them produced more drama than
‘hard news’…In such a rancorous environment, Kennedy appeared
relaxed, alert, precise, unruffled—in sum, calmly courageous (Windt, Jr.,
“The Public Presidency” 94)
Although no studies were performed following the debates to question the effect of novel
media use on citizens’ candidate preference, it is reasonable to assume under media logic
theory that citizens were so focused on seeing the drama of the presidential debates play
out on television that they forgot to thoroughly listen to the candidates’ actual responses,
and thus remained unaware to some degree of each man’s ideas and policies. Although
this could be seen as a hindrance, the visual nature of televised debates only served to
benefit the young and appealing Kennedy. In fact, those who listened to the debates on
the radio considered Nixon victorious, but those who watched the debates on television
considered Kennedy victorious (Hersh 155). However, other researchers are more modest
in their conclusions regarding winners and losers such as Tannenbaum, Greenberg, and
Silverman, who claim that while Nixon definitely did not win the debates, Kennedy did
18

not necessarily win them, either (287). Even if no clear winner could be determined,
Kennedy did gain via the televised debates. Media logic, then, worked in his favor while
simultaneously working to the disfavor of Nixon.
Because “the candidates—both seasoned radio and television performers’—and
their advisers, both political and technical, realized the tremendous impact of the media
with its ‘winner-take-all’ implications” during these debates, it seems as if they should
have begun the series on equal footing (Seltz and Yoakam 73). Unfortunately for Nixon,
Kennedy seemed to experience ‘beginner’s luck’ and almost always came out on top
during these televised debates. For example, during the crucial initial debate, “Kennedy
drew the first position in the first debate, a turn of fate his advisers considered very
important. Nixon, therefore, went first on the last debate” (77). Although going first in
the last debate may at first seem like a win for Nixon, the truth was that at this point in
the debate series, most Americans had already made up their minds and stopped viewing
(and/or listening to) the debates. A worthwhile question, then, is why had Americans
already stopped listening? Although no scholarship can as of yet provide any definite
answer, certain characteristics of Kennedy’s may have had an impact on viewers’/voters’
decisions at the ballots.
During the televised debates, Kennedy displayed before a national audience
physical qualities and responses in action that would not have been witnessed on such a
large scale sans the medium of television. In other words, he was “alive” during the
debates. Moreover, Nixon’s illness and habitual scowling during the initial debate not
only became a lasting image in the minds of Americans for the duration of the series, but
also portrayed the latter as quite the opposite of the energetic Kennedy: he had recently
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lost weight following knee surgery, he was a running a fever, was perspiring heavily, did
not focus his eyes, and was fatigued (Sorensen “13 Lessons” 20; Seltz and Yoakam 95).
However, even had he been well, Kennedy seemed to be a “natural” in front of the
camera, and was thus stiff competition to the older, weary Vice President:
When Nixon went on camera for a pre-show check, his representatives
were in the control room. They asked for certain lighting changes to
reduce a shine on his temple and for the floor lights to be raised in
intensity to increase his eye light. CBS personnel and the Kennedy
advisers looked at Kennedy for about the same amount of time—three or
four minutes—and made no changes. (Seltz and Yoakam 85)
Before the pre-show check, Nixon’s chief adviser mentioned the Vice President’s pale
skin and dark hair were difficult to favorably light, an issue that the tanned Kennedy did
not experience (85). Simply put, the latter made for a better subject of television cameras
than did the former. Kennedy, then, not only physically appealed to the audience because
of his own appearance, but also because of the sharp discrepancy between his looks and
Nixon’s. While appearances may not have played such a large role in affecting voters in
any other venue, such as a face-to-face town hall meeting or a typical campaign speech or
rally, the televised nature of the Great Debates brought with it factors that Nixon had not
had to deal with in other political activities; never had he been required to debate with
another candidate in front of the nation under such conditions. Kennedy, on the other
hand, thrived in this sort of environment, and the difference between his image and
Nixon’s did not go unnoticed by a public being introduced for the first time to televised
presidential debates.
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Parasocial Relationship
In addition to media logic as a theory for interpreting Kennedy’s visual rhetoric,
parasocial relationship theory also plays a crucial role in creating Camelot. As defined by
Deanna Sellnow, parasocial relationships are those relationships that are “onesided…where one party knows a great deal about the other party, but the other does not.
Parasocial relationships often occur between celebrities and fans” (165). Because the
First Family possesses celebrity-like fame, this theory exploring how intimacy and
privacy influences the masses to feel as if they personally know someone promises a high
degree of relevance. One particular instance operated on such a personal note and thus
aided in the formation of a parasocial relationship between the First Family and the
public: Jackie’s White House tour following the redecoration. Interestingly, the
President’s opinion of the White House tour was that it only served to make him appear
foolish, as he felt his small role in it made the entire event too informal; however, viewers
reacted positively to the tour, due in large part to the informal, and thus personable, feel.
The tour created a sense of intimacy between the public and the First Family because it
emphasized the similarity in domestic concerns shared by Jackie and families across the
nation, because the televised nature of it brought viewers straight into the White House
itself, and because John referred to his wife informally, which reflected privacy between
the couple, and let the American public take part in that private reference.
Firstly, Kennedy’s willingness to allow cameras into the family’s home did much
to remind the American public that although the Kennedys were held in highest esteem
and considered American royalty, they were similar to the average American in certain
regards. Jackie’s interest in and commitment to redecorating the family’s home mirrors a
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concern with which many families can identify. As opposed to discussing public policy,
legislation, or international affairs, the First Family was instead discussing their choice to
use certain colors in certain rooms, and provided information on the White House’s
decorations. Thus, the tour added a personal side to what was formerly a more
professional parasocial relationship; although the American public had seen the
Kennedys on television before, this was the first time the family spoke directly to the
public about non-political matters in a way that was relatable to the public. Although
Jackie had previously given interviews in which she discussed her parenting style and
personal feelings of her husband’s career, these interviews always framed her as more
than just the average wife or mother—she was the First Lady, and therefore different than
the rest of America’s ladies. Although redecorating the White House is different than
redecorating any other house, the medium of the television did not deny Jackie authority
in framing the tour as that of a “normal” American home.
Secondly, the tour’s televised nature brought the event into living rooms across
the country, characterizing it with intimacy and immediacy. Whereas magazines
surrounded Jackie’s interviews with their reporters’ own words mentioning Jackie’s
elevated status as First Lady, Jackie herself spoke directly to the public over the
television, and was thus able to portray the event as she wished. Because she focused not
so much on her status as First Lady or the fact that the White House was the subject of
redecoration rather than a typical house, she fostered a sense of sameness with the
American public. The American public experienced the tour as if they had a more
personal relationship with the Kennedys—as if they had actually been inside the
Kennedy’s home and walked with Jackie through the redecorated rooms. The television,
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then, let Jackie express herself as a woman interested in domestic matters while allowing
the public to feel they were getting to know her—a woman just like every other
woman—a little more intimately. This feeling of intimacy was further established when
John made his small appearance during the tour, and committed what he felt was an
embarrassing mistake.
Thirdly, John’s small flub (if it can even be considered a flub at all) added to the
creation of a parasocial relationship between the Kennedys and the American public.
When he briefly interrupted the tour and called his wife “Jackie” as opposed to
“Jacqueline,” he did not initially take notice. It was only after this fact was pointed out to
him by a family friend that he realized his mistake (Bradlee 57-8). In fact, the informality
of “Jackie” as opposed to “Jacqueline” may have even aided the familiarity Americans
felt to the Kennedys that resulted from the White House tour; not only were Americans in
the White House with the First Family, but now they were on a first name basis—and an
informal one, at that. Although John never publically referred to his wife as “Jackie” after
the White House tour, its inclusion could only serve to foster a sense of intimacy that is
needed for the establishment of a parasocial relationship (Bradlee 58; Sellnow 165).

Visual Pleasure
Visual pleasure theory asserts that “visual images in the media encourage viewers
to look pleasurably at female images via a male gaze,” which is the way one looks at the
subject of a visual image through the lens of a male, even if the viewer is not a male
(Sellnow 144, emphasis hers). As President and First Lady, the Kennedys were the
subject of much media attention. While traditional understandings of the male gaze focus
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on how females are depicted, I argue that John himself was also the subject of the male
gaze. Rather than look at him in a sexual manner, though, viewers could find pleasure in
his image by identifying valuable qualities he possessed, such as the power and position
he represented. In other words, he was pleasurable to look at because of his authority as
Chief Executive. Additionally, I argue that Jackie was pleasurable to the female gaze
because of her embodiment of the feminine ideal—a devoted wife and mother who
exhibited current fashion; in other words, women looked to her as a role model, and
found her image thus pleasurable.
Psychoanalytic theory, in which visual pleasure theory is rooted, argues that
people enjoy viewing images that remind them of themselves, or of a better version of
themselves that they could be (Sellnow 147). Simply put, people like to see other people
that reflect characteristics the already have or aspire to. John Kennedy was young, tan,
and appeared physically fit (Sorensen, Kennedy 23-4). He was confident, calm, and had a
sense of humor (13-14). Because these qualities are associated with him, his image comes
to represent all those characteristics. Kennedy’s image then, communicates
metonymically, as it compacts all the desirable qualities of the American President in a
single image (Sellnow 143). Thus, when one looked at a picture of Kennedy, one saw
beyond a man in a suit—he was the charismatic young President with an appealing
personality (Sorensen, Kennedy 24). Additionally, he possessed the most power an
individual in American society can possess. Thus, when people viewed his image, they
associated his person with that desirable quality of power, and could then identify their
own positions of power (even though those positions were not associated with the same
amount of power as the President’s). Kennedy’s image also served as a reminder of the
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power to which presumably anyone in the country could rise. This idea of relating to
power via visual images of the President relates mostly to the way a male would react to
John. However, females could relate to John as the image of a father and husband,
identifying in him characteristics their own husbands embodied. Thus, when they saw the
President, they saw a man reflecting the American ideals that were likely existent in their
own homes and families, and about which their own husbands cared. In addition to
John’s image as a source of visual pleasure, First Lady Jackie also represented qualities
that gave her image a pleasurable appeal.
As First Lady, Jackie supported her husband’s career by entertaining guests at
lavish White House parties, participating in interviews and politically-related trips, and
taking interest in causes her husband supported, such as improving relations with foreign
nations (Gerston 56). In addition to her responsibilities to her husband, she also had
obligations to her children. Visual images of Jackie, then, acted metonymically to remind
American women of the feminine ideals of that time. While images of Jackie could also
be assessed through the male gaze, to limit her image as only the target of a male viewer
while ignoring the impact that same image had on women would be a major flaw; Jackie
was a role model for women, after all, especially in regards to fashion.

Social Learning Theory
Albert Banduras’ social learning theory asserts that individuals learn how to
behave by observing and imitating others (Sellnow 164). As the most powerful family in
the country, the Kennedys were in such a privileged position that other Americans could
look to them for examples of how to behave, think, and even dress. The influence of the
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First Family on citizens reflects Banduras’ idea of the symbolic model—the Kennedys,
through photographs and television, influenced others’ way of living. In fact, it is sound
to assume these images did have quite an impact in light of recent research: “Visual
material is felt far more viscerally than text, and human beings are far less skilled at
guarding their judgment against this style of persuasion. One implication is that
communicators gifted in the use of visual rhetoric will thus exert enormous influence
over target audiences” (Gurri, Denny, and Harms 102). The same research team later
states that political messages are especially likely to persuade constituencies by
demonstrating certain ideals, glorifying leadership, and portraying patriotism (104). The
Kennedys model these strategic appeals, and their images had much sway over
Americans’ opinions of politics, and American life in general, at that time. The Kennedys
embodied the American dream, and reminded citizens what that meant via their images
(106). In other words, ordinary citizens could look at visual representations of the
Kennedys and be reminded of what it meant to be patriotic, to be American, to be
optimistic about the New Frontier—to be a Kennedy. Although the President had much
power in terms of portraying a certain image, his wife’s rhetorical appeal is also worth
investigation, as her sense of style left quite a mark on the American public.
A major category of influence over which the First Family exercised control was
the fashion industry. In her collection of Jackie Kennedy photographs, Jill Gerston
mentions the impact the First Lady had on the fashion world:
Jacqueline Kennedy entered the White House and completely transformed
the image of the first lady. She brought youth, vitality, and
sophistication...to the stuffy confines of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Her
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beauty and understated elegance captivated the public and captured the
spirit of change that was taking place in the nation. (55)
Gerston goes on to say in the same article that Jackie’s fashion, sophistication, and
concerns with issues such as the arts inspired American women to embrace similar styles
and ambitions. Testifying to Jackie’s influence was the special exhibition of her clothing
at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, the event which inspired Gerston’s
article (56). In conclusion, Jackie’s role as fashionable model in regards to both dress and
behavior fit her role as the President’s wife while also demonstrating a way of life that
inspired many women, who learned how to be feminine by taking cues from the First
Lady (Hummer 404). As gender theorist Brett Lunceford states, “Clothing is far more
than simply garments that cover one’s body. Rather, clothing has social and political
implications” (67). By choosing to dress in a feminine manner, Jackie conveyed to the
public that it was not only appropriate, but also desirable, to dress in such a way.
Although an examination of her fashion’s influence on gender performance and the
resulting consequences would prove valuable for a full understanding of how social
learning theory affects women, it is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, what
remains easily seen from this brief look at her fashion is the iconic role she played in
shaping Camelot’s rhetoric and influencing the American (feminine) public.
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CHAPTER 3
CAMPAIGN RHETORIC

This chapter examines the specific rhetorical strategies that characterized Kennedy’s
1960 presidential campaign, including his use of ethos centered in his veteran status, his
use of wit and humor, and his elocution.

Ethos
According to Corbett’s explanation of Aristotle’s second canon, successful use of
ethos as a persuasive appeal is rooted in a speaker’s character. Once that person has
“ingratiated himself of herself with an audience—and thereby gained their trust and
admiration,” that person can more easily persuade the audience to support him or her in
whatever context (23-4). Corbett later goes on to mention that if the speaker cannot gain
trust from the audience, all other rhetorical strategies will most likely prove futile, as
audiences are quite reluctant to be swayed by an persuasive strategy of a person whom
they cannot identify or trust (24). Kennedy understood that trust was important in
attracting voters. Because his family name was a familiar one in politics, he had a head
start in the presidential campaign. However, by emphasizing his ethos in another manner,
he ensured himself even more support.
Beyond relying on the political careers of his father and grandfather, Kennedy’s
status as a veteran of World War II served to propel his popularity with the public. Not
only had he served his country during one of its darkest hours, but he had also come
home celebrated—he received the Purple Heart award for his brave actions after Axis
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powers sunk his U-boat and he pulled his comrades to safety despite life-threatening
injuries of his own (Sorensen, Kennedy 18). His service greatly boosted his chances on
the political scene, as it made him a charismatic leader, according to Max Weber’s
theory. Charismatic leaders are qualified to rule the masses because they have shown
“heroism or exemplary character” (Weber 175). Leaders with charisma display
supernatural-like qualities, and in the minds of the public, represent a different breed of
human altogether. Charismatics are those individuals who earn the right to lead by one of
three means: possessing magical powers, leading the hunt, or being heroic in war (177).
Although Kennedy’s survival in war could be interpreted as proof of magical powers, his
main claim to rightful leadership rested in his service. When he returned to America and
embarked on his political campaigns, his status as a war veteran did more to propel his
chances at victory than did his prestigious last name; as Weber highlights in his work,
charismatic leaders, even if born to privilege, are charismatic because of a unique quality
they possess, not one shared by many others, even family members (178). Thus, if
Kennedy’s appeal to ethos was found in his war veteran status, the question arises as to
why he, and not another war veteran, became so highly regarded and exuded such
charismatic appeal and authority. Although many politicians have served in the military
and even received awards for their efforts, few leaders made as light of that time as John
Kennedy, who often joked about his Purple Heart when publicly asked about his time in
World War II. When combined with his sense of humor and sharp wit, Kennedy’s ethos
as veteran and charismatic gained strength.
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Wit and Humor
As rhetorical devices, wit and humor add life to campaign speeches that are
usually characterized by legislative, policy-filled jargon about what aspirations a
candidate hopes to one day fulfill. In the midst of serious questions and answers, humor
goes a long way to inject life into an otherwise dry speech. Additionally, humor allows an
audience to see that the speaker understands how not to take him or herself too seriously.
As rhetorician George Campbell said,
The subject of humour is always character, but not everything in character;
its foibles generally, such as caprices, little extravagancies, weak
anxieties, jealousies, childish fondness, pertness, vanity, and self-conceit.
One finds the greatest scope for exercising this talent in telling familiar
stories, or in acting any whimsical part in amused character. (16)
Because Kennedy’s character—his ethos—lay at the heart of his qualification to lead in
political office, his sense of humor about his own person demonstrated a comfort with
public scrutiny of his life. One of his most famous humorous remarks occurred when “a
flippant high school youth asked him…how he came to be a hero, he gaily replied, “It
was easy—they sank my boat” (Sorensen, Kennedy 18). Although he could have replied
with some long speech about his injuries, and the threat of Axis powers overtaking his
unit, he instead modestly reported he had neither intention nor autonomy in becoming a
hero. He took an epic story and portrayed it as nothing more than mere accident. Later in
his campaign, when military professionals surrounded him with hopes of placing a
serviceman in the Oval Office, Kennedy did not let his own glorified past fog his vision
of those whom he thought less than reputable; he even told a friend he had serious doubts
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regarding such generals and admirals because of the “superhuman ability of the Navy to
screw up everything they touch” (qtd. in Sorensen, Kennedy 18). In a similar vein, Erik
Hansen notes in his article on presidential rhetoric that Kennedy’s speeches often
contained friendly jocosity in the midst of serious content (114).
Kennedy’s humor was not reserved only for those who supported him, but also
characterized those tense moments when he encountered a dissenter. While campaigning
in Cincinnati, the locals laughed at his New England pronunciation of the city. Rather
than feel embarrassed or ashamed, Kennedy merely remarked that he was from Boston,
and would be happy to explain to them how to pronounce it (Sorensen, Kennedy 180).
During another speech, when a small group of Nixon supporters interrupted him with a
“We want Nixon” chant, Kennedy simply replied, “I don’t think you’re going to get him,
though,” then later addressed a conclusion to “all you young Nixonites—all eight of you”
(181). Rather than let dissension defeat him, Kennedy relied on his humor to continue
winning support and endure the trials of the campaign. Fortunately for him, “every
situation had its humor,” and thus he never had to try too hard to make light of the even
the most challenging and tiring circumstances (180).
Even after his election, Kennedy continued to make light of serious situations as a
means to dispel stress and handle situations more level-headed. Friend and reporter Ben
Bradlee once asked Kennedy how he planned to break the news to the public that he was
going to chose his brother Bobby as Secretary General. Kennedy responded with the
following: “Well…I think I’ll open the door if the Georgetown house some morning
about 2:00 A.M., look up and down the street, and if there’s no one there, I’ll whisper
‘It’s Bobby.’” (Bradlee 38). Similar reports of his use of humor to handle an array of
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situations, from informal and relaxed to the most stressful, reflect his reliance on humor
as a way to both attract supporters and make sense in his own mind of the events
happening around him.

Elocution
As Corbett instructs in his text on classical rhetoric, flawed elocution and delivery
can be fatal for the rhetor. Among the issues he touches on and in which Kennedy lacked
at the beginning of his presidential campaign is articulation (410), a problem with
delivery that nearly cost Kennedy voters simply because they could not understand him
(Powell 60)
Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric was initially filled of botched elocution. As James
Powell notes, Kennedy did not start the 1960 presidential campaign as a naturally gifted
speaker, but needed much training to become the suave orator he is now remembered as
(59). Although he possessed charm and confidence, his delivery of speeches lacked the
poise characteristic of his personality when not on the campaign trail. For example,
Powell states Kennedy initially spoke so quickly that many listeners could not understand
the majority of what he said; he was once clocked as saying 100 more words than the
average person would say in a sixty second period (59-60). Compounding this difficulty
was his habitual pronunciation of “s” as “z” and “sh” as “zh” (60). Add to those problems
his pitch, which was reported as being too high during the campaign’s early days, and
Kennedy represents a litany of oratorical mistakes. However, after coaching and
experience, he began transforming into a more polished speaker.
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After learning to control his speed, consonant pronunciation, and pitch,
Kennedy’s enthusiasm and determination took center stage as opposed to his
communicative shortcomings. Kennedy’s speeches were now “vivid, energetic,
memorable, and…eloquent” (Bose 6). His energetic appeal permeated in his words: “He
looked, acted, and talked in a vigorous way. Indeed, so much so that during the televised
speeches of October 31 and November 4, 1960, Kennedy’s characteristic jabbing of the
lecturn with his index finger came over the microphone as a heavy ‘thump-thump’”
(Powell 62). In other words, his zealous delivery was captivating and alive. He even felt
confident enough with his skills to deviate from the prepared text and ad lib when it
suited the situation better than what had been written (Sorensen, Kennedy 177). He did
not shy from interjecting thoughts with “spontaneous remarks” which were “consistently
more effective than his prepared texts because they were delivered with more conviction
and vitality” (177).
It was also during this stage of his campaign when he began inserting repetition
and antitheses in his speeches, the latter of which would become one of his best known
trademarks (and which will be discussed in the next chapter, concerning crisis rhetoric)
(Sorensen, Kennedy 177; Bose 6). Adding to these positive traits was Kennedy’s desire to
keep all his speeches short (usually less than twenty minutes) (Powell 65). Because of his
vivacious delivery and short duration, people found it easier to follow his words rather
than let their thoughts drift, as was prone to happen during longer, slower speeches (61).
In fact, what content was contained in his brief speeches was “factual, direct, and
specific,” thus ensuring the few minutes he did speak was not spent simply with filler
(Sorensen, Kennedy 177). By the end of the campaign, Kennedy’s “oratory became less
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frenetic, and even spiced now and then with humor and a sense of kinship with his
audiences” (66). At least two months before the election, Kennedy portrayed the type of
delivery that reflected his true talent, as he was even compared to the great orators of the
past during a September 2, 1960 speech (66). Although elocution is only one among
many factors that affected Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric, it remains one of the most
pressing for further study, as had it remained as it was during his initial campaign days, it
is highly unlikely he would have been remembered as the suave politician he came to be
known as. Additionally, because he relied so much on speeches to convey information
about the status of national and international affairs, especially during times of crisis, had
Kennedy not refined his oratory, the country may have experienced undue hardship in
trying to discern the thoughts, ideas, and words of its leader.
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CHAPTER 4
CRISIS RHETORIC

This chapter examines six characteristic rhetorical strategies on which Kennedy relied
when persuading the American public to support him during times of national and
international crisis: arousing fear, using antithesis to spur civic engagement, appealing to
time, making no promises, manipulating the press, and when necessary, apologizing.

John Kennedy faced a series of national and international crises during his
presidency, and thus his administration was marked by this characteristic (Windt, Jr.,
“The Public Presidency 92). His rhetoric during those times proves worthy of study, as
such political tension threatened his efficacy as president. Only one crisis is widely
regarded as a failure—the Bay of Pigs incident—while the multitude of other crises are
popularly regarded as, if not quite victories, at least not failures. Kennedy’s ability to face
crises reflects the confidence he exuded during his campaign days: “Kennedy was expert
in the confrontational crisis presidency, crises largely…under control” (Hansen 111).
Because stakes were high in such moments, the way Kennedy maintained control and
chose to respond to crises reveals insight into his understanding of persuasion, especially
in terms of persuading the American public to support him. When dealing with crises,
both potential and actualized, Kennedy relied on six tactics (among others) to garner
support: arousing fear in the public concerning inevitable crises, using antithesis to
encourage nonpartisan cooperation and civic service to overcome crises, appealing to
time by emphasizing the immediate nature of crises, making no promises about crises’
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outcomes, manipulating the press to portray the most favorable interpretation of the
outcomes, and, when left no other choice, admitting strategic mistakes and taking
responsibility for undesirable outcomes, or, simply put, apologizing. General calls to fear
the future, the need for civic service on behalf of all citizens, the immediacy of such fear
and service, and the ambiguous future appear in several of Kennedy’s speeches, but his
inaugural address, in addition to setting the tone for his administration, eloquently
contains all these appeals. Other speeches demonstrating these appeals were made during
specific crises, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the botched Bay of Pigs operation.

Arousing Fear of Inevitable Crisis
Apocalyptic rhetoric dominated Kennedy’s speeches (Bose 7). In light of
developing national and international tensions, John Kennedy believed the 1960s would
be a decade of “maximum danger” (Windt 92). Accordingly, “crisis—both domestic and
foreign—was the theme of the Kennedy administration,” and became a staple of his
speeches starting with the one he gave during his inauguration (90). As confidante and
speech collaborator Theodore Sorensen later shared in his book Kennedy, the amount of
crisis content in the inaugural speech was extensive, even to the point of taking Sorensen
off guard: “As each successive draft was reviewed, he sought to make more somber his
warning to the country of the perils that lay ahead,” and continuously inserted new
additions to the speech highlighting such perils (292). In John W. Garnder’s 1962
collection of Kennedy’s speeches, To Turn the Tide, the President himself mentioned the
impending doom Americans faced in the book’s Introduction, which he authored: “In
1961 the American people awakened as never before to a sober realization of the perils
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that beset our nation…Neither wind nor tide is always with us. Our course on a dark and
stormy sea cannot always be clear” (xvii). A large reason the American people may have
“awakened as never before” to the dangers facing the country could be Kennedy’s use of
fear rhetoric to shake them out of their complacency and sense of safety, reminding them
that there are no guarantees in a world on the brink of possible destruction. Some scholars
argue he relied on fear so much because he understood firsthand that such fear can
“produce the ‘hard shocks’ capable of influencing public opinion” (Meagher 50). In other
words, he knew that if he could create an atmosphere of fear in which the public expected
to live, he could keep them in his control by suggesting that despite fear-inducing threats,
he had the answer to how to remain safe and survive the threats. In other words, the
nation was just as much on the brink of destruction as it was on the brink of unlimited
opportunity. His inaugural address demonstrated the tactic to create fear and then act as
the fearless leader ready to tackle imminent threats. For example, in the January 20th,
1961 address, Kennedy said the following that reflect fear and the ability to overcome it:
“Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate,” “Let both sides
seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors,” “Only a few generations
have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not
shrink from this responsibility; I welcome it” (Inaugural Address 3-4). Although there
were undoubtedly situations to fear in light of the Cold War and its potential to evolve
into World War III, Kennedy understood arousing fear, even when unnecessary or
unfounded, could serve to his advantage, and thus repeated this rhetorical tactic in
numerous speeches.
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On several other occasions, Kennedy reminded his audiences that there would be
much to fear in the near future. For example, only one year after his inauguration,
Kennedy hinted at the expansive number of threats that, upon entering office, he learned
endangered the country:
No man entering upon this office, regardless of his party, regardless of his
previous service in Washington, could fail to be staggered upon
learning…the harsh enormity of the trials through which we must pass in
the next four years. Each day the crises multiply. Each day their solution
grows more difficult. Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum
danger, as weapons spread and hostile forces grow stronger... the tide of
events has been running out and time has not been our friend. (qtd. in
Gardner 22-3)
To combat the unfavorable tides, Kennedy knew he had to do more than scare Americans
into listening to him; he also needed to unite them. Unless the public put aside their
differences to battle the threats as a unified force, America would be vulnerable to
internal dissension and thus weakened in the face of external warfare. However, if
citizens agreed to face terrors together and follow President Kennedy’s lead, there was
chance of victory. In other words, by instilling a sense of fear into the people, Kennedy
assured less dissension among them while simultaneously gaining increased public
support.
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Using Antithesis to Encourage Non-Partisan Cooperation and Civic Service
Kennedy understood the power of using “us-against-them” rhetoric to ensure
public support for his planned courses of action; antithesis was hence a major part of
creating that dichotomous mindset (Meagher 52). He would identify an enemy to the
freedoms enjoyed by Americans, and then remind citizens that in order to retain their
rights, they would have to work together against that enemy: “For only with complete
dedication by us all to the national interest can we bring our country through the troubled
years that lie ahead” (qtd. in Gardner 32). Thus, although the country faced numerous
dangers, the President, and those persuaded by his rhetoric, believed any threat could be
overcome with nationally unified support. Once secured, though, unified support had to
translate into action in order for it to have any impact on political happenings. Thus,
when Kennedy unified the public, he then called for increased civic service.
An easy way to accomplish unification and encourage civic service was the use of
antithesis, a characteristic staple of many of Kennedy’s speeches. The inaugural speech
which Kennedy delivered on January 31, 1961 demonstrated the new leader’s favoritism
of antithesis as a rhetorical strategy to affect his audience. Regarding the speech, Edward
Kenny notes “It was peculiarly synchronic. Antithesis is orderly. There is a neatness of
arrangement, a symmetry, about its contrasting elements. It offers immediate
categorization of viewpoints into distinct polar points. As a rhetorical device of contrast,
order and balance, it had particular currency in a disordered age” (19). Demonstrating the
neatness of categorization and the simplistic contrasting are the following excerpts of
antitheses selected from a transcript of the speech: “To those old allies…to those nations
who would make themselves our adversary,” “not a victory of party, but a celebration of
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freedom,” “not because we seek their votes, but because it is right,” “we offer not a
pledge but a request,” “not a new balance of power, but a new world of law,” “not as a
call to battle…but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle,” “ask not what
your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country” (Inaugural Address
1-4). For a speech as short as his inaugural one, the amount of antitheses reflects the
President’s dichotomous mentality—there is good, there is America, there is victory, but
there also exists bad, enemies, and failure or defeat.
After pushing antitheses highlighting potential crises, Kennedy called for
increases in unified civic service. He felt “that through collective sacrifice and
governmental intervention, America could transcend the crises at home and abroad”
(Depoe 221). He relied heavily, then, on support from the public. His own past in the
military may have laid the foundation for this type of reliance on cooperation between the
public and government; as trauma theorist Judith Herman suggests, those exposed to war
count on support from fellow fighters: “the situation of constant danger led soldiers to
develop extreme emotional dependency upon their peer group…they observed that the
strongest protection against psychological breakdown was the morale…of the…fighting
unit” (25). Although Kennedy may not have exhibited extreme emotional dependency,
and although his concern was the political, rather than psychological, ramifications of a
crisis, he did rely upon support from his country—his peers—to survive crisis situations.
Thus, his constant outreach to the public to band together as a unified group under his
leadership reflects not only his personal past as a war veteran, but his understanding of
how a nation should operate: as one group achieving common goals while pitted against a
group with opposite goals. Accordingly, in his speeches to the public, Kennedy urged
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nonpartisan unification and civic service so as to accomplish all of which the New
Frontier was capable. Demonstrating his reliance on the American public, Kennedy told
an audience the following:
Finally, our greatest asset in this struggle is the American people—their
willingness to pay the price for these programs; to understand and accept a
long struggle; to share their resources with other, less fortunate
peoples…to serve in the Peace Corps or the Armed Services or the Federal
Civil Service or the Congress…to take part in Civil Defense…and, finally,
to practice democracy at home, in all states, with all races, to respect each
other and to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens. (qtd. in
Gardner 52)
Whether because of his war experience or political training, Kennedy understood that
“when presidents declare a ‘crisis,’ public support dramatically increases, if only
momentarily (Windt, Jr. 95-6). By constantly reminding the public of potential crises,
Kennedy was constantly increasing his support while reminding citizens how important it
was to “live up to their public responsibilities,” and thus, serve America so as to defeat
their antagonists (95). Kennedy provided the public with a problem/solution framework,
and charged citizens with cooperating to produce and effectively carry out the solution.
Thus, by framing situations in terms of antithesis and encouraging unified support and
public engagement to overcome crises, Kennedy garnered support while preparing the
nation for potential danger.
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Appealing to Time
Time plays a crucial role in moving societies toward political action, and always
has (Depoe 217). Accordingly, politicians appeal to citizens’ sense of time in order to
persuade the masses that their goal must be achieved soon, or even now, if it is to ever be
achieved at all. In fact, skilled politicians realize that to best persuade constituents means
creating the sense that unless a collective consensus is reached immediately, the nation
faces catastrophe: “In the public sphere of argument practice, Goodnight stated, ‘Public
time is constituted in the urgency created by discourse that reshapes the landscape of
common opportunities and constraints’” (Depoe 217-18). Thus, when orators speak about
the necessity for quick response, they are tempting listeners to engage in action now, not
later:
While rhetoric is produced at a particular moment in time, the speaker is
attempting to construct a persuasive view of time to lead audiences toward
desired actions or possibilities. Leff has noted a direct relationship
between the sense of time constructed by the rhetor within the textual
context of a particular message and the audience’s experience of time in
defining situations for action: ‘Time as experienced in the text becomes a
vehicle for transforming time as experienced in the world to which the text
refers.’ (Depoe 217)
As a rhetorical appeal, urgency pushes individuals into feeling that they are responsible
for quick movement so as to ensure minimization of potential crises, that “modern
democracy hinge[s] on the actions of [that] moment” (Killingsworth 42-3). Kennedy felt
he was leading the country through uniquely tumultuous, yet simultaneously promising,
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times: “These are extraordinary times. And we face extraordinary challenge (qtd. in
Gardner 49). Putting the same idea in different terms, he once said “We stand on the
razor edge of history” (Depoe 223). He felt a sense of urgency leading the nation into this
razor edge that presented opportunity for many outcomes, and, in order to ensure public
support, determined to influence Americans into sharing that feeling of immediacy with
him.
During his first State of the Union Address, Kennedy said that “Each day the
crises multiply. Each day their solution grows more difficult. Each day we draw nearer
the hour of maximum danger, as weapons spread and hostile forces grow stronger... the
tide of events has been running out and time has not been our friend” (Gardner 23). By
repeating the phrase “each day” three times in three sentences, Kennedy reminds, and
urges, the public to hearken his words that soon, if not already, they will find themselves
in battle. However dire the current moment seemed, though, Kennedy “appeal[ed] to a
brighter future in which the good can be sustained or recovered” following the crisis at
hand (Killingsworth 44). Thus, he did not simply paint a morbid picture for Americans,
expecting them to be motivated simply out of fear of immediate danger. He also hinted
that once the battle was overcome, the nation would experience a more optimistic future.
In other words, immediate action could result in future reward. Interestingly, although he
suggested battles overcome would be rewarded, he never straightforwardly claimed those
battles would indeed be won. In fact, he often reminded the public that he had no idea as
to what the outcome of any situation would be.
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Making No Promises
In his 1961 State of the Union Address, Kennedy acknowledged that he could not
make any promises as to the outcomes of the struggles facing the nation, nor was he
willing to even predict them (Gardner 16). His honesty in admitting his inability to
foresee the future implies he was ethically obliged to refrain from influencing the public
to think he possessed more control than he really did. In other words, he reminded the
nation that he was merely human. Although this honest tactic would seem to weaken
public faith in him, it had the opposite effect: the public trusted him more because of his
honesty, and, after being reminded he needed their help, felt more obligated to participate
in civic service, just as he had been asking of them. He involved citizens in directing the
country with him: “Before my term has ended, we shall have to test anew whether a
nation organized and governed such as ours can endure. They outcome is by no means
certain. The answers are by no means clear. All of us together—this Administration, this
Congress, this nation—must forge those answers” (Gardner 15-6). By refusing to
shoulder all the responsibility for every action, Kennedy made the public aware that he
would do as much as he could to walk the nation safely through crises, but that because
he could not predict the future, he would need their sympathy and understanding if not
every crisis was victoriously won. This tactic would prove quite useful when briefing the
public about the failure at the Bay of Pigs. However, it also proved useful even when
speaking of crises that were not such fiascos.
In October of 1963, Kennedy faced the largest of his political crises—the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Sorensen Kennedy 718). During the thirteen day period, Kennedy
reminded the public that just like them, he could not predict the course of events: “My
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fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort which we
have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or
casualties will be incurred” (Kern, Levering, and Levering 126). All he could promise the
country was that in crisis situations, “sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead” (126).
Fortunately, the public had already been encouraged to unify themselves in civic service
on many occasions, starting with Kennedy’s Inaugural Address. The call to sacrifice and
practice self-discipline, then, was no new favor which Kennedy asked. Thus, when crises
did occur, the public was prepared to face them with their President, trusting his
leadership and being sure to not expect more from him than was humanly possible.
Simply put, Kennedy lowered the standard by which the public should judge his actions.
Luckily for Kennedy, his successful handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis far exceeded
what could have been expected of any president, and thus public support expanded for
him and his successful handling of the situation that nearly ignited World War III.
However, what the public did not know was how Kennedy had achieved that success.
Although he claimed Khrushchev backed down in light of America’s determination and
strong will, the truth would come out years later—a truth that implied a much different
handling of the situation than Kennedy suggested.

Manipulating the Press
On occasion, political tension between nations may be so delicate and complex
that the Chief Executive has no option but to manipulate the press, either by withholding
or inaccurately reporting data. In such situations, Kennedy knew the importance of
manipulating the press (Windt, Jr. “John F. Kennedy” 93). The Cuban Missile Crisis
45

exemplifies the way in which Kennedy used the press to his advantage while handling
crises. Rather than consult with Congress or prepare statements regarding the situation
with his Cabinet, Kennedy decided the press would be the ideal way to inform the nation
about the Crisis, and thus told reporters, journalists, and editors about the presence of
medium-range missiles on the island (Sorensen Kennedy 717-18; Kern, Levering, and
Levering 123-27). This information was not released to the general public until roughly a
week later. During that week, the press kept the classified information relatively secret:
“Despite a few veiled suggestions in the press that something was happening with Cuba,
the story was held in an atmosphere of heightened expectation as the press awaited the
president’s word” (Kern, Levering, and Levering 126). Because Kennedy briefed the
press in private, he was able to put his own spin on the situation, and thus painted the
circumstances in such as way as to make himself appear as favorable as possible. As one
research team worded it, “the press allowed Kennedy, [Secretary of Defense Robert]
McNamara, and other officials to disseminate their views without challenge…the
administration dominated the sources during this period of expectation as never
before…The press, by giving full credence to the administration’s interpretation of
events, had played a major role in [Kennedy’s] multifaceted triumph” (124, 126, 139). In
fact, Kennedy’s concern over how the information was depicted to the public led him to
create so many rules regarding information released to the press and public that it became
difficult to the point of impossibility for his administration to follow (Sorensen Kennedy
321). The President felt that if too much information regarding the delicate circumstances
that threatened nuclear holocaust were released, developments between himself and
Communist Cuba and Russia would be jeopardized. Therefore, Kennedy felt he had the
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ethical right and responsibility to control what, and how much, information left the White
House (320-21).
Of course, had Kennedy not maintained control of the press, the public may have
discovered how he actually handled the crisis; as opposed to the publicized story that
Khrushchev backed down to Kennedy’s determination and will, Kennedy actually
worked out a secret compromise with the Soviet leader (Hersh 342). B. Gregory Marfleet
explains that a new understanding of the situation, “generated from recently available
data, holds that Kennedy negotiated in a quid pro quo manner…the removal of the Soviet
Missiles in Cuba” (546). In exchange for Khrushchev’s removing the medium-range
missiles from Cuba, Kennedy removed American missiles from Turkey (342-45).
Interestingly, it appears that Kennedy negotiated with Khrushchev out of fear—the exact
type of negotiating Kennedy adamantly warned the American public about in his
Inaugural Address. However, because Kennedy was able to hide this information from
the press, and therefore the public, during his administration, the popular account of the
resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis depicts a more ruthless course of events that
favored America: “Qualitative examinations of the public rhetoric support the
interpretation that Kennedy made a stand, the opponents faced each other ‘eyeball to
eyeball,’ to quote Dean Rusk, ‘and the other fellow just blinked’” (547). While this
account does paint a promising picture of an able president whom Americans could easily
rally behind and support, it would not have been possible without a manipulation of the
press.
Kennedy was not afraid to use the press so as to publicize his successes while
hiding his flaws, shortcomings, or even lies (Sorensen 319). However, one crucially
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honest admission to the press concerning his shortcomings during the botched Bay of
Pigs operation earned him more approval points than could have any manipulation of the
press.

Apologizing
On one particular occasion, Kennedy faced a crisis and did not emerge the
winner. On April 17, 1961, he agreed to a strategic move that cost many lives and
botched a delicate operation meant to lessen the power of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro
(Sorensen 294). Instead, Castro’s followers overtook American forces, resulting in an
embarrassing loss for Kennedy. Rather than deny his mistake or try to rationalize it away
to the American public, he “swallowed defeat instead” (Douglass 2). In his statement to
the nation following the fiasco, he stated that he and his administration would not be
committing such a grave mistake twice: “We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend
to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds” (qtd. in Gardner 47). Interestingly, he
did not stop at admitting his administration’s fault—he then took individual and sole
responsibility: “There’s an old saying that victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an
orphan…I’m the responsible officer of the government and that is quite obvious” (Hersh
209). While a public apology may initially suggest weakness on a president’s part, it only
served to endear Kennedy in the minds of the public. As Sorensen mentions in Kennedy,
it was after his national confession to fault and refusal to lay blame on anyone, especially
the Republican Party, that Kennedy won (or, in some cases, re-won) the admiration of
citizens (309).
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Although the majority of America felt touched their leader would admit his flaws
and accept responsibility, others found Kennedy’s rhetorical strategy of the public
apology irritating: “Hedley Donovan, onetime editor in chief of Time, Inc., wrote in 1987
that the president ‘was getting preposterous praise—and amazingly high ratings in the
polls—for simply stating the inescapable constitutional fact that he was “responsible”’”
(Hersh 209-10). Kennedy himself joked about the surge in his approval rating: “The
worse I do, the more popular I get” (qtd. in Dallek 4).What may have aided his rise in
ratings was that by admitting his participation in the fiasco, he was making himself
vulnerable to criticism just like this from the public. The public, rather than jump at the
opportunity as Donovan did, sympathized with the President; after all, he was only
human, and mistakes are characteristic of all mortals, even America’s leader. Because he
honestly admitted his fault in the Bay of Pigs incident, the public only increased their
support: “private and public polls showed an ever-increasing popularity, and, what was
even more encouraging, a genuine sympathy for his burdens of office” (Markmann and
Sherwin 323). Because of the public’s gracious sympathy, Kennedy “gained
immeasurably in public esteem and emerged from the ordeal a national hero” (Kern,
Levering, and Levering 139). Such a warm reception following the Bay of Pigs helped
Kennedy regain the confidence he had lost due to the defeat. As one of his close friends,
reporter Ben Bradlee, mentioned in his collection of private conversations with Kennedy,
“The Bay of Pigs shook his confidence—almost beyond repair—in the CIA and in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Right after the fiasco, and after he had quickly accepted
responsibility, he was philosophical. ‘Presumably,’ he said, ‘I was going to learn these
lessons some time, and maybe better sooner, than later’” (Bradlee 42-3). He did indeed
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learn from his mistakes after the Bay of Pigs incident, and strategically solved the Cuban
Missile Crisis without sparking a nuclear war with the Soviets:
Kennedy earned plaudits and admiration not only for his clear triumph but
for his cool style and confident demeanor between the discovery of
medium-range missiles on Cuba on October 15 and Khrushchev’s public
capitulation on October 28. ‘It was this combination of toughness and
restraint,’ Arthur Schlesinger wrote in A Thousand Days, ‘of will, nerve
and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated, that
dazzled the world…The thirteen days gave the world—even the Soviet
Union—a sense of American determination.’ (Hersh 342)
Kennedy was the first president to realize that if the nation’s leader were strong enough,
he/she could easily manipulate the press for his/her own benefit. Although some might
see such manipulation as exploitative, Kennedy saw it as strategic, and it served him
well.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RHETORIC OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND CULTURAL TRAUMA

This chapter examines how John Kennedy’s assassination was necessary for the
substantiation of the Camelot myth, and how the memory of his death has to be
understood as traumatic and shared by the nation as a collective whole in order for
Jackie’s claim that John’s presidency had been Camelot to be accepted.

During a parade as part of a political trip to soothe inter-party tensions in Dallas,
Texas on November 22, 1963, two bullets struck John F. Kennedy—one entering through
his back and exiting through his throat, the other entering and exiting through his skull
(Moy 248). Many people witnessed the event either in person or on television (Culbert
422). Kennedy died within a matter of hours at a local hospital (Giglio 353; Moy 248;);
the American public, then, had not just witnessed an attack, but also a murder. Moreover,
they witnessed the murder of their Chief Executive.
President Kennedy’s assassination resulted in two significant impacts on the
nation: the sharing of a collective memory of a cultural trauma, and the creation and
solidification of the American Camelot. The second impact is contingent on the first; had
the President not been assassinated, Jackie’s claim that Kennedy’s White House was
Camelot would not have translated into a lasting legacy. To understand how the
assassination is essential for the existence of the Camelot myth, it is first necessary to
understand the theories of collective memory and cultural trauma. Only then will the
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reasons for Kennedy’s assassination igniting the American Camelot myth be clear from a
scholarly angle.
Collective memory retains and transmits knowledge of a society’s past. In his
article “Collective Memory and Cultural Policies,” Victor Roudometof examines shared
cultural identity, of which heritage plays a critical role. Heritage, according to
Roudometof, consists of all that is handed down through the generations from the past.
Some aspects of heritage are more desirable than others, but even the negative parts of
the past must be passed down so as to transmit the whole of heritage, or a holistic shared
past, that serves to unite the current generation (3). Roudometof reports that American
culture, unlike European cultures, prefers the term “memory” to “heritage”; although the
two are alike in meaning, memory possess a quality heritage lacks—it is malleable (3).
As he goes on to explain, “Memory is a process, not a thing: It is something people do
but not something people have” (8, emphasis his). Thus, historical facts (and how they
are perceived) are open to reinterpretation in American society. Although events can be
cast in a more gracious light than they may deserve, collective memory does have
limitations—significant events cannot be altogether forgotten or represented as their total
opposites. Thus, negative events will retain negative qualities in the collective memory,
but may be tempered or modified with some type of positive spin, such as extracted
significant meaning for the society.
When collective memory pertains to a negative event that psychologically scars a
community, it becomes a traumatic collective memory. As cultural theorist Susannah
Radstone states, “One definition of trauma theory suggests that [trauma]
includes…collective experiences” (11). Thus, one need not be a firsthand participant in a
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traumatic event to identify it as traumatic or experience the consequences (Halas 315).
These traumatic collective experiences, or cultural traumas, reflect on a societal level
what is also happening on the individual level: mourning, grieving, and attempts to define
and understand the situation (or meaning-making). While individual members of society
can help one another cope with a traumatic event, it is not sufficient for complete societal
healing. As trauma theorist Judith Herman notes, “Remembering and telling the truth
about terrible events are prerequisites…for the restoration of the social order” (Herman
1). Thus, collectively remembering a trauma can aid the societal healing process. Cultural
traumas, however, demonstrate the limits of collective memory’s ability to reshape the
past; while remembering and discussing trauma can be beneficial, the trauma itself can
neither be completely changed nor forgotten, although some sense of meaning can be
extracted from it, even if the meaning extracted is based upon false information. Hence,
society may find meaning (and thus, healing) in a negative event by attributing undue
positive qualities to the people involved in the trauma. Positive attribution as a means of
societal healing is greatly aided by mass media’s ability to shape the collective memory
concerning the traumatic event and the individuals (specifically the victims) involved.
Media assists both collective memory and cultural trauma. By allowing events to
constantly be revisited and reinterpreted via television and film, interviews, and books
(among many other outlets), mass media manipulates society’s collective memory of the
event. Additionally, mass media assists cultural trauma by portraying past events that
need to be discussed if a society is going to heal as per Herman’s suggestion. By
preserving an event on film or paper (or any other means, for that matter), a society can
continuously bring up the event for the purpose of defining it as traumatic, attaching
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significance to it, finding meaning in it, and passing down that meaning to future
generations:
An occurrence like an assassination is not a significant event until it is
accepted as such by an audience… there must be some fit, some common
understanding between the narration provided by journalists and their
readers or viewers. The story, in other words, must be understood and
resonate with those to whom it is addressed. The accounts provided
through mass media thus must be constructed in such a way that they are
meaningful and emotionally compelling for a particular audience.
(Eyerman 457)
Immediately after the assassination, news reports flooded television and radio channels,
spreading the news at unprecedented speed (Sheatsley and Feldman 189). The media
saturated the public with a sense of loss and grief, and rather than reporting the event and
continuing with regular programming, focused solely on the unfolding tragedy: “The
President was shot at 12:30 p.m. (CST) on Friday; he was pronounced dead at 1 o’clock.
By that time 68 per cent [of American adults] had heard the news…By 6 p.m. the
penetration had reached 99.8 per cent” (192). The events following the assassination were
just as heavily covered by the media, and since the Monday following the Friday
assassination was declared a national day of mourning (and was also the day of the
funeral), the period between the assassination and funeral was filled with information
regarding Kennedy’s death and funeral, as well as the apprehension of Lee Harvey
Oswald and his murder at the hands of Jack Ruby. Sheatsley and Feldman emphasize the
abnormal amount of attention paid to media during this four day period: “By his own
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estimate, the average adult spent eight hours on Friday, ten hours on Saturday, eight
hours on Sunday, and another eight hours on Monday, watching television or listening to
the radio” (197-98). The American public’s devoted attention to the President’s death and
following events created an apt environment for what Jackie did shortly after her
husband’s death to ensure the Kennedy legacy was a favorable one.
In addition to the immediate media depicting the assassination, Jackie’s interview
three weeks late with Theodore White concerning her husband’s role as Arthur serves as
another primary, and necessary, emotionally compelling vehicle by which mass media
dispersed the Camelot legacy (Brigance 2). By the time of the interview, a postassassination popularity poll had already been conducted, and reported that
approximately half of the American population considered Kennedy one of the top two or
three best presidents in the nation’s history, with about another third of the population
claiming he had been better than average. These statistics reveal the impact of Kennedy’s
death in granting favorable reception, as when they are compared to “a release dated
November 10, it was reported that a relatively modest 59 per cent approved of ‘the way
Kennedy is handling his job as President,’ while 28 per cent disapproved and 15 per cent
were undecided” (Sheatsley and Feldman 205). The public obviously understood the
events to be both traumatic and significant; however, if perchance individuals had not
already identified the assassination as such on their own, Jackie was sure to use mass
media to ensure the message reached American citizens. In doing so, she became what
Ron Eyerman calls a carrier—those who create and perpetuate a myth so as to influence
public reception of a person or event: carriers “are active after the fact and are thus also
concerned with how an incident and the victim will be remembered” (Eyerman 460).
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Jackie was the leader of those who would claim John was the modern American Arthur—
she called his tenure “Camelot,” and those of the American public who agreed with her
became carriers of that myth, spreading it across the nation and down through the
generations. Interestingly, and in line with Eyerman’s theory, she never associated
Kennedy with Camelot until after his death. Thus, the label was a posthumous one.
Beyond creating a favorable legacy for her late husband, the mythic framework
she provided also helped citizens continue life by helping the traumatized nation make
sense of the tragedy (Herman 188). The Camelot myth, then, reassured the jilted public
by clearly informing them how to interpret the traumatic event. In addition to her
interview, other forms of media captured the event and, once offered to society, were
interpreted as significant and traumatic without any direction from Jackie. An example of
this type of media would be the assassination footage filmed by Dallas citizen Abraham
Zapruder (Culbert 427). His footage captured the assassination and was presented to the
public immediately following the event; it has continued to be examined and re-examined
even to the present day, just as Jackie’s interview with White has continued to influence
America to the present day: “Collective memory is the site where the past, present and
future exist in a symbiotic relationship…Thus, once Camelot was adopted as a narrative
structure for our collective memory, it did more than explain the past. It continues to
influence and reflect our perceptions and actions in the present and future” (Brigance 9).
Because of its graphic nature, the public did not struggle to define such footage as
traumatic in 1963, and every re-playing of the footage serves to further solidify that
traumatic label even in 2012. The words and images of Jackie’s interview and Zapruder’s
footage thusly proved effective and meaningful to the public both then and now, or else
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the Camelot legacy would not have become or still be a part of American culture.
However, Jackie and Zapruder were not the first people associated with the assassination
to realize the power of media on society’s psyche.
Although media proved critical in shaping Kennedy’s reputation postassassination, Kennedy himself knew the importance of media in molding a favorable
standing while alive and in office, suggesting Jackie took a cue from his own interests:
“John Kennedy believed that the United States Information Agency should spread
information about America through the production of films, but not pedestrian
educational films with modest budgets and low production values” (Culbert 424). While
this particular initiative received less attention from Kennedy’s administration than the
Space Race, War on Poverty, and Communist relations, Kennedy’s desire for a collection
of national films capturing the ideals of the country did become a reality at his funeral:
The state funeral footage is ‘inescapably affecting.’ Of course it is. The
technical quality of the camerawork, given the privileged location for the
official cameramen, assures us a chance to view the Kennedy funeral in a
way that ennobles the meaning of the president’s life. It then allows
Hershensohn [the director] to transfer viewer emotions from the funeral
itself to Kennedy’s legacy. (Culbert 426)
Transmitting Kennedy’s somber funeral ceremony on national television ensured the
traumatic nature of the President’s death was not lost on the American public. Moreover,
the televised funeral highlighted the endurance of the already-forming Camelot legacy:
“The most inspired part of Hershensohn’s film [is] the refusal to mention even the name
of Kennedy’s assassin. We are instead told that the assassin failed because the assassin
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was unable to destroy the Kennedy legacy…The lasting legacy of the Kennedy
presidency would far outlive the shots fired in Dallas” (Culbert 427). Because the funeral
footage focuses on Kennedy’s lasting impact rather than his mortality and the bullets that
ended his presidency, it serves to solidify Camelot, thusly placing a positive spin on the
collective memory of cultural trauma. Although the negative memory cannot be
completely erased from the collective mind or turned into a wholly positive event,
meaning can be extracted from it.
While mass media’s role in shaping and modifying past events allows meaning to
be extracted from even the most tragic of events, it can also reflect objectively fictitious
(though subjectively factitious) beliefs held by the public. According to Radstone,
culturally traumatic events can neither be forgotten nor accurately remembered (Radstone
21). Nostalgia, by virtue of its excessively sentimental nature, reflects a longing for a past
that, in memory, appears more utopian than it actually was. An alternative definition of
nostalgia posits it as the ‘product of a shared historical consciousness of general
displacement’ that renders individual suffering socially meaningful” (Roudometof 5).
When these two definitions are combined, they result in the idea that the past is
interpreted in an overly sentimental manner than not only emphasizes the difference
between the past and present, but also helps explain how a society has responded to such
a difference. Nostalgia, then, assigns meaning to the past, and by sharing a feeling of
nostalgia for Kennedy’s White House, American society assigns significance to both his
life and death, and refers to this significant moment in history as “Camelot.”
Simultaneously, society prohibits any other leaders from entering Camelot; it is now,
after all, locked in the past.
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Even if Camelot cannot be replicated, nostalgia for it continues to exist.
Highlighting how “Modernity…has forged a radical transformation of the relationship
between communities and the past, whereby, under the influence of nostalgia, new realms
of memory [are] produced,” Victor Roudometof outlines why interest still abounds in the
Kennedy family—an interest that shows itself in many forms (6). A prime example of
this interest is the History Channel mini-series The Kennedys (Muse Entertainment).
Starring prominent and award-winning celebrities such as Greg Kinnear, Katie Holmes,
Tom Wilkinson, and Barry Pepper—all of whom can attract large audiences—the show
revisits Camelot, accentuating the glamour associated with it while also depicting
Kennedy’s faults in a sympathetic light. Other forms of media that depict interest in the
Kennedys include the newly released interviews with Jackie following John’s death, and
interest in the Kennedy family’s feelings toward Barack Obama, whom some Kennedy
family members claim is the next Arthur (Schlesinger;Sawyer, Gibson, and
Stephanopoulis). In fact, as Roudometof argues, instilling nostalgia in the younger
generation via mass media is critical for the transmission of collective memory:
Modern societies operate under the imperative to construct and maintain a
whole array of products and practices that are essential for the
transmission of memory from one generation to the other. Modernity is
said to cause the erosion of identity, social values, and personal
integrity—and this erosion leads to a perceived loss of a heritage and the
inevitable nostalgia toward a real but most often imagined past. (6)
By constantly revisiting the Camelot myth via mass media, Americans are ensuring they
do not lose contact with the memory of Kennedy. Each time Camelot is re-examined and
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re-perpetuated through such forms of entertainment (or scholarly examination), it
continues to remain a significant part of the nation’s collective memory, and therefore
culture.
The effect of the media-perpetuated collective memory of this cultural trauma is
an undue positive regard for the late President. Because of the tragic nature of his death
and his widow’s claim to Camelot, “John F. Kennedy has achieved a popularity in death
which he did not nearly approach in life” (Rosenberg 52). This popularity is renewed
with each nostalgic re-visitation of the assassination, and over time has led many
Americans to attribute excessive praise to the slain leader, whom they believe embodied
all the highest virtues a leader could possess. Thus, they assign him “ardor not usually
lavished on men, even great men” (52). Both Moy and Rosenberg go on to describe the
type of legendary status given Kennedy, arguing that in American politics, only
presidents such as Abraham Lincoln receive similar positive regard; outside American
politics, King Arthur is the best known example of this type of memorialization (Moy
246; Rosenberg 59). While America’s devotion to cherishing the memory of Kennedy
initially appears touching and patriotic, it harbors potential for unrealistic interpretations
of a past that was not nearly as pure as Camelot appears to be.
The public should be cautioned against nostalgic attributes, as they carry with
them the potential to spin historical truth into a lie. The nostalgic legacy of Kennedy
asserts his political superiority to most presidents, both before and after him, while
ignoring the darker side of Camelot: “In the decade following the assassination they [the
ideals of Camelot] have proven far more resilient than the real men who embodied them”
(Rosenberg 58). In a similar vein, another scholar suggests “the assassination of President
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Kennedy marks the point at which we took leave of the truth” (qtd. in Johnson 107).
Thus, to remember Kennedy as a young, healthy, and intelligent, for example, skims over
his many health afflictions and ignorance in certain political situations, such as the Bay of
Pigs or Cuban Missile Crisis. Cultural theorist Elżbieta Halas warns against one-sided
interpretations of collective memories that fail to incorporate new information: “The
modern history of memory should take into consideration the appearance of a new
criterion for selecting facts worthy of remembrance and commemoration” (Halas 315).
To follow her advice would require the American public to weigh the accomplishments
and positive characteristics of Kennedy with his scandals and shortcomings. Any
interpretation less balanced threatens to give a grossly inaccurate account of history, even
if the less balanced account is only slightly inaccurate. According to Emile Durkheim,
collectives can exemplify a common sentiment to the point that it outgrows the emotion
shared by individuals, and morphs into a new feeling altogether—one that is much more
powerful (Durkheim 93). This new feeling, grown from an exaggerated sentiment felt by
the masses, would be much more powerful, and therefore tougher to correct, than
ordinary emotions. Durkheim, then, warns against collectives birthing new social facts
that are rooted in undue emotion much the same way as Halas cautions the public.
Despite warnings from theorists like Halas, it was easier immediately following
the assassination to believe in the Camelot myth than to examine the political (and
possibly more factual) ramifications of Kennedy’s death: “The multitudinous political
ramifications of such events [following Kennedy’s assassination] are too complicated and
diffuse to comprehend; we seek instead a more familiar referent. At such times, too, our
attitudes are strongly swayed by emotion, and our emotions tend to seek a human object
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rather than an abstraction” (Sheatsley and Feldman 207). When Jackie dubbed John’s
tenure as “Camelot,” she did so in front of a public still grieving for their late president, a
public thus easily swayed by emotion (Brigance 2). Halas’ warning still goes largely
unheeded today because the myth is now so intertwined into the culture. After entombing
John and his characteristic rhetoric within the frame of Camelot, Jackie, and the public
who followed her lead, passed down the false legacy to the current generation, who,
although aware of Kennedy’s many faults, find the cultural memory of the traumatic
event strong enough to still outshine the darker side of Camelot—the side consisting of
his blatantly denied health problems, extramarital affairs, unethical ties to organized
crime, and overall lack of political efficacy and accomplishment. Kennedy’s legacy
testifies to the adage that the presidency “is not just an office of incredible power but a
breeding ground of indestructible myth” (qtd. in Sheatsley and Feldman 210), and proves
that even time will be hard-pressed to destroy such a golden age as Camelot.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

At least two conclusions emerge from this study in Kennedy’s rhetoric: his career
provides a lesson in executing persuasive appeal and a convincing façade, and no
president, including Barack Obama, can revive Camelot.

Kennedy entered office as an inexperienced senator whom many accused of
riding his father’s coattails into the presidency. After elected, choosing his own brother as
Attorney General (a position for which Bobby was sorely unqualified) displayed the
privilege of familial ties in the Kennedy White House (Hersh 44). Over the course of his
presidency, Kennedy used his rhetoric to persuade the American public that he was
indeed capable and competent to lead the country though the tumultuous times ahead. As
previously discussed, however, he never made any promises about the future. He
presented himself as an able-bodied politician with pragmatically optimistic ideas, but at
the same time did not claim to possess more power or authority than he actually did.
Even if he had to use vague calls for action that used pathos to encourage the actions of
American citizens, he still refrained from committing to any certain course of action. As a
result, he always appeared to be the “winner” in political situations, and when he was not
(such as after the Bay of Pigs disaster), he apologized for not being able to avoid
hardship. Essentially, Kennedy seemed to be a leader he was not: experienced, prepared,
honest, and worthy of admiration. However, the scandals of both his life and tenure
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suggest he was not the Jack Kennedy many believed him to be. The lesson that can be
learned from his presidency, then, is thus: persuasive rhetorical tactics can convince the
public of something nonexistent, of something greater than what was. Just as Camelot
came to be an American truth via rhetoric, so can anyone’s persuasive appeal come to be
regarded as reality. Current and future politicians would benefit greatly from learning this
lesson.
A second lesson from this study implies that no president can replace Kennedy,
nor revive Camelot. Because the Kennedy family had been involved in politics long
before John’s death and showed promise of producing another President, many
Americans remained hopeful following the assassination that one of John’s brothers
would run for President after Lyndon B. Johnson finished his term. The public got what it
wanted; Bobby ran for President in 1968, but was assassinated after winning the
California primary (Eyerman 461). Although the youngest Kennedy brother, Teddy, held
a seat in the United States Senate for nearly forty years, he never ran for President for a
multitude of political and professional reasons—his alcoholism as a result of grieving his
brothers’ deaths appeared to be the most prominent (Meachem par. 1). Because the
Kennedy family has not produced an heir to Camelot, many questioned whether Barack
Obama would become the next Arthur—he was popularly regarded, after all, as the
closest political semblance to John Kennedy that the nation had seen since Bobby.
When Senator Obama announced his presidential candidacy for the 2008 election,
the numerous similarities between him and Kennedy were almost immediately spotted,
and quickly turned into a hot topic covered by reporters and devoured by citizens.
Regardless of whether one supported Obama or not, the likenesses he bore to JFK were
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irrefutable: he was a relatively inexperienced senator who had not been a part of any
major political victories in Congress, represented a minority which the American public
struggled to trust and accept in office, and promised a drastic re-haul of the American
government that would favor and reflect the ideologies of the younger generation.
The component ingredients that came together to produce Kennedy’s Camelot
will most likely never coexist in the same measure again, preventing a second Camelot.
Kennedy—a man made in war, defined during his campaign as a hero, constantly
attached to some form of crisis, aided by Ted Sorensen, regarded as celebrity-like, and
unexpectedly assassinated—led an administration that is difficult, if not possible to
replicate. In order for a second Camelot to emerge in American politics, all of the factors
that contributed to Kennedy’s reputation and legacy would have to again be present,
under similar circumstances, and aided by the same types of individuals. Kennedy’s
Camelot, then, will never re-emerge under the leadership of another, and the optimism,
hope, and change he promised the nation regrettably died with him. Maybe Jackie
expressed the temporal, ethereal nature of Camelot best when she quoted her late
husband’s favorite song: “Don’t let it be forgot, that once there was a spot, for one brief
shining moment that was known as Camelot.”
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